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CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA DEPUTY

CHARLES E. BECKNER F91260 P.O. BOX 3535 NORCO, CALIFORNIA

PRO PER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESTERN DIVISION

CHARLES EDWARD BECKNER,) CASE NO.:CV08-00482BEN(JMA)

PETITIONER,)

VS.)

MATTHEW M. MARTEL, WARDEN,)

RESPONDENTS.)

REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESTERN DIVISION

IN RE

6 CHARLES EDWARD BECKNER,

CASE NO.:CVO8-00482BEN(JMA)

PETITIONER,

VS.

MATTHEW M. MARTEL, WARDEN,
RESPONDENTS.

REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

ARGUMENT ONE

THE RESPONDENTS HAS NOT DENIED THE PETITIONER SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED

IN A HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING IN WHICH THE PETITIONER CLAIMS HIS SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS, EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND HIS PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE DENIED, DUE TO THE VIOLATION OF TIME RESTRAINTS, THE COURT SHOULD TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE TIME LINES FOR SUCH HEARING AGREED TO BY THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. (SEE INRE MARQUEZ, 153 CAL. APP. 4TH)

PAGE ONE

THE PETITIONER, CHARLES E. EDWARD, PURSUANT TO RULE OF EVIDENCE 201, REQUEST THE COURT TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 825 AND THE UNITED STATES 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

A JUDICIALLY NOTICED FACT MUST BE ONE SUBJECT TO

REASONABLE DISPUTE IN THAT IT IS EITHER(1) GENERALLY KNOWN WITHIN

THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT OR (2) CAPABLE

OF ACCURATE AND READY DETERMINATION BY RESORT TO SOURCES WHOSE

ACCURACY CANNOT REASONABLY BE QUESTIONED. JUDICIAL NOTICE MAY BE

TAKEN AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 825
STATES AS FOLLOW:

(A)(1) THE DEFENDANT SHALL IN ALL CASES
BE TAKEN BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE WITHOUT
UNNECESSARY DELAY, AND IN ANY EVENT
WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER HIS OR HER ARREST
EXCLUDING SUNDAYS AND HOLIDAYS.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 14TH AMENDMENT
READS AS FOLLOW:
NO STATE SHALL MAKE OR ENFORCE ANY LAW
WHICH SHALL ABRIDGE THE PRIVILEGES OR THE

IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES;

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NOR SHALL ANY STATE DEPRIVE ANY PERSON

OF LIFE LIBERTY OR PROPERTY, WITHOUT

DUE PROCESS OF LAW; NOR DENY TO ANY PERSON

WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION THE EQUAL PROTECTION

OF THE LAWS.

IT MUST ALSO BE NOTED PURSUANT TO RULES OF EVIDENCE 201 A COURT SHALL TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE WHEN REQUESTED BY A PARTY. THE PETITIONER CHARLES E. BECKNER, REQUEST THE COURT TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF STATE OS CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 825 AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

THE REMEDY FOR DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION
IN FAILING TO HOLD TIMELY HEARING IS TO RELEASE THE DETAINED, TO
DETER ANY AND ALL FURTHER VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE. THE PETITIONER COUNSEL HAD NEVER MET OR
COMMUNICATED WITH THE PETITIONER AND THUS WAS UNABLE TO PERFORM
FUNCTIONS OF COUNSEL. THE PETITIONER DID NOT RECIEVE NOTICE OF
CHARGES AND EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM, ALL OF WHICH DENIED HIM OF HIS
EQUAL PROTECTION, SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

THE RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO ALLEGE FACTS DEMONSRATING
THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CHALLENGED DETENTION. (SEE COUNTY OF
RIVERSIDE V. MC LAUGHLIN, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991)

IF A PARTICULAR PROCEDURAL REQUIRMENT OF STATUTE IS
DEEMED MANDATORY, THEN GOVERNMENTAL NON-COMPLAIANCE WITH THE
PROCEDURAL REQUIRMENT INVALIDATES THE ACTION TAKEN IN VIOLAATION
OF THE PROCEDURAL REQUIRMENTS. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES THE
STATE TO PROVIDE "A FAIR AND RELIABLE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE
CAUSE AS A CONDITION FOR ANY RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY. (SEE GERSTEIN
V. PUGH, 95 S. CT. 854)

ARGUMENT TWO

CHARELES E. BECKNER WAS COERCED IN VIOLATION
OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE STATE AND
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

THE PETITIONER CHARLES EDWARD BECKNER, IS ILLEGALLY
DETAINED AND IS ENTITLED TO HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF BECAUSE HIS
PLEA WAS COERCED AND INVOLUNTARY. SPECIFICALLY, HE WAS PROVIDED
AN ADVOCATE OF THE PROSECUTION DISQUISED AS A PUBLIC DEFENDER
WHO REFUSED TO BE HIS ADVOCATE AND FORCED HIM TO TAKE A PLEA HE
DID NOT UNDERSTAND INVOLUNTARY. MOREOVER IT MUST BE NOTED HE ASK
MORE THEN ONCE TO DEAF EARS FOR A MARSDEN HEARING.

IN THE OPPOSITION, RESPONDENTS STATES THAT THE EXCHANGE INDICATES THAT THE PLEA WAS RELUCTANTLY ENTERED, BUT NOT AGAINST CHARLES E. BECKNER WILL. HOWEVER RESPONDENTS FAILS TO EXPLAIN HOW A PRIMA FACIE CASE IS NOT ESTABLISHED. THE RECORD IN THIS CASE

PAGE FOUR

ESTABLISHES THE PETITIONER'S PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY.

A DEFENDANT CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT GO TO TRIAL OR A
SENTENCE HEARING, UNLESS HE HAS SUFFICIENT ABILITY TO CONSULT WITH
HIS LAWYER, WITH A REASONABLE DEGREE OF RATIONAL UNDERSTANDING.
THE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE HAD A RATIONAL AS WELL AS FACTUAL
UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROCEEDING. IN THIS CASE CHARLES E. BECKNER
DID NOT HAVE A RATIONAL AS WELL AS FACTUAL UNDERSTANDING DUE TO
THE PUSH OF BOTH HIS ATTORNEY AND THE COURT TO CLEAR HIS CASE
FROM THEIR DOCKET. (SEE COOPER V. OKLAHOMA (1996)

IN ALL CASES, THE COURT MUST MAKE A FINDING THAT THE PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY AND WAS MADE KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY. (SEE IN RE JOHNSON (1965) 62 C2D 325) IN ADDITION, DEFENDANTS MUST BE ADVISED OF THE DIRECT CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA. (SEE BUNELL V. SUPERIOR COURT(1975) 13 C3D 592, 602; LOWA V. TOVAR (2004) 541 US 77) THE TRIAL COURT MUST SATISFY ITSELF THAT THERE IS A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEA PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE 1192.5. THE COURT KNEW THE PLEA WAS NOT VOLUNTARY AND KNEW THE PETITIONER, DID NOT MAKE THE PLEA KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THE PLEA WAS MADE TO THE PETITIONER HORROR.

THE ADVICE TO THE PETITIONER WAS NOT PRESENTED IN A
BALANCE FASHION BUT WAS ONE-SIDED AND INACCURATE IN THAT MR.
BECKNER WAS NOT TOLD THAT THE COURT COULD CONSIDER SETTING ASIDE
A STRIKE EVEN IF HE WENT TO TRIAL AND WAS CONVICTED OF THE SAME
OFFENSE AND STRIKE FINDINGS. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR
BELIEVING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS GIVEN ENOUGH TIME TO THINK
ABOUT THE OFFER AND CONSULT WITH A COMPETENT ATTORNEY. THE
RECORD INDICATES NO BREAKS IN THE PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH THE

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COUNSEL AND THE PETITIONER, WERE GIVEN A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER. THUS THERE IS NO BASIS FOR BELIEVING THAT COUNSEL FILLED IN THE CORRECT INFORMATION AND PROPERLY ADVISED THE PETITIONER, CHARLES E. BECKNER.

CONCLUSION

THE RESPONDENT, HAS NOT STATED THE PETITIONER SPEEDY TRIAL
RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED, THUS THE COURT MUST ACCEPT THE PETITIONER
STATEMENTS AS TRUE. THE PETITIONER HAS ALSO MADE A PRIMA FACIE
SHOWING THAT HIS PLEA IN THIS CASE WAS INVOLUNTARY UNDER THE TOTALITY
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND COERCED UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES. FURTHER, PETITIONER HAS SHOWN THAT HE HAS NO
ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION SHOWN
OTHER THEN A WRIT. ACCORDINGLY, THE WRIT SHOULD BESISSUED.


DATEDMSERTEMBER 1, 2008

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

9/2/2008 BY: Charlo E. Beckner

CHARLES E. BECKNER/PETITIONER

HIBIT



DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT:	١
Late Arraignme	N+

Exhibit:

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EXHBIT

<u>B</u>

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT:

LAWS Regarding

ARRAIGNMENT

Exhibit: B

CRIMINAL CAW-PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - '07)

ARRAIGNMENT

ELENA CONDES

I. OVERVIEW §6.1

An arraignment is a court hearing at which an individual accused of a public offense—an infraction, a misdemeanor, or a felony—is informed of the nature of the charge or charges, given a copy of the accusatory pleading, and given an opportunity to enter a plea. Pen C §988; In re Mitchell (1961) 56 C2d 667, 16 CR 281. It is the defendant's first court appearance. See Pen C §§740, 806, 1462.2.

In addition to fulfilling these statutory requirements, the judge or magistrate conducting the arraignment is also required to advise each unrepresented defendant of the right to counsel and the right to have appointed counsel if indigent. Cal Const art I, §15; Pen C §§858, 859, 987(a). In counties using mass advisements, the initial advisement of rights includes other trial rights.

If the defendant is charged with a bailable offense, the court must also set bail at the first court appearance, unless bail has already been set. Cal Const art I, §12; Pen C §1271. See Van Atta v

Scott (1980) 27 C3d 424, 166 CR 149.

When the arraignment takes place depends on several factors, the most important of which is the defendant's custodial status. If the defendant is in custody, arraignment must take place within 48 hours (not including weekends and court holidays) after the arrest. Pen C §825. If the defendant was arrested without a warrant and has not yet been released, the arraignment is usually combined with a probable cause determination. This determination must be made by a magistrate as soon as reasonably feasible but no later than 48 hours after arrest, weekends and holidays may not be excluded from the 48 hours. County of Riverside v McLaughlin (1991) 500 US 44, 57, 114 L Ed 2d 49, 63, 111 S Ct 1661. See §6.23.

If the case is not disposed of at the arraignment, the court will also set the date for the next hearing.

II. CHART: DEADLINES §6.2

> Deadline Procedure

In-custody defendant arraigned on complaint (either misdemeanor or

felony).

Without undue delay, no more than 2 calendar days after arrest (excluding Sundays and holidays)

Cal Const art I; Pen C <u> 88825, 849; People v Lee</u> (1970) 3 CA3d 514, 83 CR

Authority:

Continuance to obtain counsel.

No more than 7 days in misdemeanor cases; no less than 1 day in felony cases.

Pen C §990.

Out-of-custody defendant arraigned on citation for

At least 10 calendar days after arrest unless

Pen C §853.6; Veh C §40303.

	Procedure	Deadline	Authority
	misdemeanor or infraction.	defendant consents to earlier date.	
• •	Out-of-custody defendant arraigned on misdemeanor complaint.	Prosecutor has 25 days after misdemeanor citation to file formal complaint. No statutory deadline for arraignment.	Pen C §853.6(e). Pen C §825 time limits apply only when accused is in custody.
	Out-of-custody defendant arraigned on felony complaint.	Without unnecessary delay (same as in-custody defendant for all practical purposes).	Cal Const, art I, §14; <u>Pen C</u> <u>§859</u> .
	Probable cause determination following warrantless arrest.	No later than 48 hours after arrest (including weekends and holidays).	County of Riverside v McLaughlin (1991) 500 US 44, 56, 114 L Ed 2d 49, 63, 111 S Ct 1661.
	Defendant arraigned on information, whether in or out of custody.	When information filed.	Pen C §§859, 1382.
	Defendant arraigned on lindictment	If arrested on bench? Wairant, same deadlines as defendants arrested on complaint?	Pen C §§945, 978.5; see Pen C §§825, 849; People v Redinger (1880) 55 C 290, 298.

IV. PROCEEDINGS ON ARRAIGNMENT

§6.4 A. Purpose of Arraignment

An individual accused of a public offense has the right under the United States Constitution to be informed of the "nature and cause of the accusation." US Const amend VI. See also Cal Const art I, §14 (arraignment for felony). Arraignment serves this purpose, and it gives the accused a fair opportunity to plead to the charges. *In re Mitchell* (1961) 56 C2d 667, 16 CR 281. In addition, both federal and state constitutions grant an accused the right to a speedy trial. US Const amend VI; Cal Const art I, §15; Pen C §1382. A prompt arraignment is a component of the right to speedy trial. On the right to speedy trial, see chap 19.

§6.5 B. Procedures Generally Applicable to Arraignments

When an accusatory pleading is filed, the defendant is arraigned on the pleading in the court in which it is filed unless the case is transferred to another court for trial, e.g., because the defendant was arrested outside the county. Pen C §976. On out-of-county arrests and arraignments, see §6.30.

Note: California courts employ four kinds of accusatory pleadings: citation, complaint, information, and indictment. Although the purpose of arraignment is the same no matter what offense is charged and what accusatory pleading is used, certain aspects of the procedure may vary, depending on the kind of accusatory pleading used and the custody status of the defendant. For discussion, see §§6.6-6.10.

Arraignment occurs when a judge (or the clerk or prosecutor acting at the court's direction) reads the accusatory pleading to the defendant and asks whether the defendant pleads guilty or not guilty. Pen C §988. A defendant accused of a felony is also given a copy of the pleading.

> Note: When a complaint charges only misdemeanor violations, the defendant who wants a copy of the pleading must request one. Pen C §988.

A defendant in a felony case is typically required to appear in person at the arraignment and most other proceedings in the case, unless he or she executes a written waiver of appearance in open court. Pen C §977(b)(1). See California Criminal Law Forms Manual §5.4 (Cal CEB 1995).

Most misdemeanor defendants may appear through counsel at all stages of the case, including the arraignment. Pen C §977(a)(1). See also Simmons v Superior Court (1988) 203 CA3d 71, 249 CR 721; People v American Bankers Ins. Co. (1987) 191 CA3d 742, 236 CR 501. However, an individual charged with a misdemeanor involving domestic violence (see Fam C §6211) or violation of a protective order (see Pen C §273.6) must be personally present at the arraignment and sentencing. Pen C \$977(a)(2). If an out-of-custody defendant fails to appear at the arraignment in person (if required) or through counsel (if permitted), the court may issue a bench warrant. See Pen C §§979-984. On failure to appear, see also §6.33.

\$6.8 Time for Arraignment

The filing of the complaint must be followed by arraignment. See Pen C §976. When the defendant is accused of a felony, the arraignment must take place "without unnecessary delay" (Pen C §860), but when the accused is not in custody, no specific statutory deadline applies. People v Newell (1923) 192 C 659, 221 P 622.



When, however, an individual is arrested and held in custody, the term without unnecessary delay" means no more than "48 hours after [the] arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays." Pen C 8825; CCP 88134-135; Govt C 886700, 6706, 71345. People v Lee (1970) 3 CA3d 514, 521, 83 <u>CR 715</u> (Saturday is a court holiday). See also *People v Pickens* (1981) 124 CA3d 800, 177 CR 555. The applicability of §825 is not limited to individuals charged with felonies; it applies to everyone arrested and held in custody, no matter what the charge,

If court is not in session when the arrest takes place, the time is extended to the next regular judicial day. Pen C §825. A defendant arrested on Wednesday must be arraigned by the following. Friday, no matter what time the arrest occurred, unless the Friday is a court holiday. Pen C <u>§825(a)(2). Code of Civil Procedure §134, authorizing local courts to conduct arraignments on </u> judicial holidays, does not convert them into nonholidays for the purpose of computing time. Forty-eight hours is only an outside limit, a delay of less than 48 hours could be unreasonable. Dragna v White (1955) 45 C2d 469, 289 P2d 428.

If the arrest was made without a warrant, an individual accused of a felony is entitled to a prompt probable cause hearing. Gerstein v Pugh (1975) 420 US 103, 125, 43 L Ed 2d 54, 71, 95 S Ct 854. This hearing is typically combined with the arraignment. An individual taken into custody without a warrant for a misdemeanor is entitled to a probable cause hearing on request. In <u>re Walters (1975) 15 C3d 738, 126 CR 239</u>. For discussion, see §6.23.

An arraignment on a complaint, whether it alleges a felony or a misdemeanor, occurs in the department of the superior court that ordinarily handles infractions and misdemeanors.

§6.9



3. Consequences of Delay

An unreasonable delay between arrest and arraignment converts a lawful arrest into an unlawful detention, and a confession obtained as a result of the unlawful detention may be subject to suppression. See People v Pettingill (1978) 21 C3d 231, 145 CR 861 (when police kept

defendant in custody for 61-hour period without arraignment and continued to interrogate him after he had invoked Miranda rights, confession was product of illegalities). But see In re Walker (1974) 10 C3d 764, 779, 112 CR 177 (delay is but one factor in determining whether statement is voluntary; confession made during illegal delay is not automatically inadmissible). See also People v Thompson (1980) 27 C3d 303, 329, 165 CR 289 (arresting officer's need for sleep did not justify delaying arraignment; however, no showing was made that illegal detention produced defendant's confession); People v Turner (1994) 8 C4th 137, 172, 32 CR2d 762 (delay did not make statements involuntary).

Document 10

An unreasonable delay in bringing the defendant before the magistrate may serve as a ground (for a civil suit against the arresting officer (Dragna v White (1955) 45 C2d 469, 289 P2d 428), but it is not a ground for dismissing the prosecution unless it causes prejudice. See, e.g., People v Valenzuela (1978) 86 CA3d 427, 150 CR 314 (reviewing court reversed dismissal because record did not support defendant's claim that his inability to obtain timely urine test was caused by delay in arraignment).

> Note: Defense counsel may seek a defendant's release from custody when the defendant is held beyond the Pen C §825 limits by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. People v Wilson (1963) 60 C2d 139, 152, 32 CR 44. For further discussion of these writs, see §§42.22-42.34.

§6.10 E. Arraignment on Information or Indictment in Felony **Prosecutions**

Misdemeanors and infractions are prosecuted either by citation or complaint. There are no other pleadings in these cases. See Pen C §§740, 853.5-853.6. In a felony prosecution, however, a complaint, if one is filed, is only a preliminary pleading. An information or indictment is required to initiate a felony prosecution. See Cal Const art I, §14.

Information. In California, the information is used far more often than is the indictment, and almost always when the event triggering the prosecution is the defendant's arrest. Thus, typically, when an accused is arraigned on a felony complaint and pleads not guilty, the magistrate sets the case for a preliminary hearing, which must be held no less than 2 court days and no more than 10 court days after the arraignment, unless there is "good cause" for delay and the defendant waives time. Pen C §859b. On preliminary hearings, see chap 8.

If the defendant is held to answer at the preliminary hearing, Pen C \$1382(a)(1) requires dismissal unless the information is filed in the superior court within 15 calendar days after the holding order was issued. Under Pen C §976, the defendant must be arraigned "when" the accusatory pleading is filed. The word "when" has been construed to mean "after." People v Hale (1957) 156 CA2d 478, 319 P2d 660. There is no separate statutory or constitutional time limit for arraigning the defendant on the information. See People v Newell (1923) 192 C 659, 221 P 622 (no statutorily prescribed time within which arraignment must take place). In practice, however, the arraignment usually takes place promptly after the information is filed.

Indictment. Although the prosecutor may seek an indictment from a grand jury after an arrest and a felony complaint, the indictment procedure is used much less frequently than is the preliminary hearing in this situation. As a rule, the prosecution seeks an indictment when the secret nature of grand jury proceedings is an important factor—for example, in investigations involving organized crime and other criminal conspiracies, or confidential or reluctant witnesses. For additional examples, see §9.8. On grand jury proceedings generally, see chap 9.

If the grand jury finds probable cause to believe a named individual has committed a felony, it files an indictment in the superior court. If the defendant is already in custody, the court will order the defendant brought before it for arraignment. Pen C §978. If the defendant is not already



in custody, the court will issue a bench warrant. Pen C §§945, 979-984. If the defendant is taken into custody on a bench warrant and held, the arraignment must take place within 48 hours (excluding noncourt days), under Pen C §825. See §§6.8-6.9.

> Practice tip: When the subject of a grand jury investigation has retained counsel before the indictment is returned, defense counsel can sometimes negotiate the bail amount or O.R. release before the bench warrant issues or is served.

Arraignment on information or indictment starts statutory speedy trial clock. The date on which the arraignment on an information or indictment occurs is important for speedy trial purposes. Under Pen C §1382(a)(2), the 60-day period for bringing the defendant to trial begins to run when the defendant is arraigned on the indictment or information. Although the date the defendant is asked to plead and the date of the plea are usually the same, this is not always true. In Chartuck v Municipal Court (1975) 50 CA3d 931, 123 CR 816, the court, noting that Pen C §988 makes no reference to entry of a plea, concluded that for purposes of computing the §1382 deadline, the defendant was "arraigned" within the meaning of the statute at her first court appearance when she was given an opportunity to enter a plea, even though she did not enter a plea at that time. But see Valdes v Municipal Court (1977) 69 CA3d 434, 438 n3, 138 CR 50 (speedy trial period did not begin to run until defendant actually entered plea). On the right to a speedy trial, see chap 19.